Selection pressure due to antibiotic use is responsible for the initial development of MDROs. Transmission from patient to patient then plays a significant part in the spread of these resistant clones. The success or failure of source isolation in controlling MDROs depends upon the relative contributions of these two mechanisms. Genetic analysis of MRSA strains shows that global spread is due to dissemination of relatively few clonal types, rather than from frequent de novo introduction of new clones. 13 Virtually all patients colonised or infected with MRSA acquire the organism from an external source, and prevention of transmission by means of isolation and barrier precautions is of paramount importance. There is also clear evidence that colonisation pressure (the proportion of patients colonised) is an important factor in the spread of VRE, supporting the use of isolation and contact precautions for this organism too. 14 Data are less complete for gram-negative organisms, with no accurate estimates available of the proportion of antibiotic resistance due to patient-to-patient transmission, for any organism in a non-outbreak setting. 15 A number of studies have demonstrated that source isolation is associated with reduced cross-transmission of MRSA within ICUs. 5, 16, 17 However, most have also employed additional measures including strict contact precautions and decolonisation, and it is often impossible to determine the contribution of any single intervention. A systematic review of MRSA isolation policies found that one-third of studies were affected by such confounding factors, while evidence from most of the remaining trials was considered weak because of poor study design or risk of systematic biases. 18 A more recent prospective two-centre trial of source isolation alone, using single rooms or cohorting, showed no effect on cross-infection rates for MRSA. 19 Evidence concerning source isolation for other MDROs is less extensive and also inconsistent. Increased use of single-patient rooms has been shown to reduce rates of infection due to Acinetobacter baumani and other gram-negative MDROs. 20, 21 VRE transmission may also be reduced by control measures which include isolation, though most trials have also included other interventions. 4 Other studies have failed to demonstrate any improvement in infection and colonisation rates attributable to isolation, for a range of organisms. 22 Despite conflicting evidence for the benefits of single-patient rooms or cohorting, most guidelines recommend source isolation as a central element of programmes to limit the spread of DROs. 3, 13, 23, 24 It is notable that success in controlling MRSA has been greatest in those countries with a rigorous national programme which includes cohort nursing and isolation of patients. 25, 26 Strategies for source isolation Source isolation alone is not enough to prevent transmission of infectious agents -it must be applied as part of a rigorous programme of infection control measures. This should include appropriate barrier precautions, controlled use of antibiotics, eradication of bacterial carriage when appropriate, environmental cleaning, disinfection of equipment and education. Active surveillance cultures are also important to allow early detection and isolation of colonised patients. 3 New, more rapid screening tests for MRSA may reduce the incidence of ICU-acquired infections. 27 Strict barrier precautions are also essential for control of MDROs and should include Standard and Contact Precautions in all cases. 3, 28 Every ICU should have single rooms available for protective and source isolation, the number required depending on local case mix. NHS hospitals have a statutory duty to provide adequate isolation facilities. 24 The design of single rooms should follow the recommendations of 'NHS Estates: Facilities for critical care' (HBN 57). 2 Clear indications for isolation must be agreed with the hospital infection control team. Each unit should have a written policy for the management of isolated patients in single rooms or cohorts, with specific references to hand washing, barrier precautions, screening and surveillance. Nursing staff should receive training in isolation procedure and compliance with protocol should be ensured by means of continuing education and audit. Nursing numbers must be adequate to allow isolated N Watson N Watson patients to be managed by dedicated nurses, who should not have responsibilities elsewhere in the unit. When deciding whether or not to use single rooms or cohorting, the benefits must be weighed against the risks of moving critically ill patients and the need for increased numbers of nursing staff.
Adverse effects of isolation
Isolation and barrier precautions have been shown to reduce contacts between healthcare providers and patients by 50% in both medical and surgical ICUs, despite the fact that isolated patients are more likely to require invasive interventions. 29, 30 The application of contact precautions has been associated with an increase in the frequency of preventable adverse events and a reduction in documentation. 31 Additional risk is introduced by the need to move infected or colonised, critically-ill patients to single rooms or cohort areas. It is important, therefore, to ensure that patients in isolation receive adequate clinical and nursing care. 3 
Facilities for isolation

Acinetobacter baumanii
Single cases require contact isolation in a side room. For outbreaks patients may be cohorted in distinct areas with separate ancillary facilities and nursing staff. 33 Other Gram-negative bacteria -Little evidence to recommend routine isolation. 15 Severe Acute Respiratory Strict adherence to barrier nursing, using Airborne, Droplet and Contact Precautions. 38, 39 
Syndrome (SARS)
Ideally, patients should be isolated in negative pressure rooms or single rooms with their own bathroom facilities. Cohorting of patients in an area with an independent air supply and exhaust system may be necessary in outbreak situations.
